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I. INTRODUCTION

In the 1980s, the recording industry began distributing music in digital
form through compact discs (under the compact disc digital audio system')
without any significant copy protection for the sound recordings. This was
a double-edged sword, since consumers purchased a staggering amount of
compact discs, replacing their old vinyl records with the new digital format
and buying new music, but they also engaged in rampant amounts of
copyright infringement. Consumers infringed by using software to make
digital files of sound recordings from the compact discs (in a process
known as "ripping"), then distributing these files to other computers in a
connected network.2 When extended to its theoretical conclusion, the
combination of ripping and distribution of digital files over the Internet
meant that only one copy of a CD was necessary to distribute the content
to everyone else in the world without cost.
In response, the industry tried to add roadblocks to ebb such
widespread piracy by including digital rights management (DRM) services
into CDs, limiting how consumers could use the music. By adding digital
rights management, the content owner was able to either stop the copying
of the file to the hard drive (copy prevention), or stop a file's distribution
or access once it was saved on the hard drive.3
However, the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA)
encountered a problem when it was creating this roadblock. The problem
the RIAA and other content owners faced is that technological solutions
did not interact well with the contours of the law, specifically copyright
law. While laws were usually subject to a wide range of interpretation,
stemming from sources such as ambiguous statutory language, or
conflicting case law, technical applications usually had bright-line
solutions that allow little room for vagueness. In the case of digital media,
the technological protection methods (TPMs) used could not accurately
reflect the state of copyright law because relationships between the rights
holder and the user of the copyrighted work were subject to a substantial

1. The compact disc digital audio (CDDA) system, also known as Red Book, is the standard
for audio CDs. Discs that do not follow the specifications of the Red Book are not allowed to use
the CDDA logo, as doing so might constitute trademark infringement. See Wikipedia, Red Book
(audioCDstandard),http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RedBook_%28audioCD-standard%29 (as of
Oct. 15, 2005, 04:31 GMT).
2. Wendy M. Pollack, Note, Tuning In: The Future of Copyright Protectionfor Online
Music in the DigitalMillenium, 68 FoRDHAM L. REV. 2445, 2450 (2000).
3. Andrew W. Bagley, Note, FairUse Rights in a World ofthe BroadcastFlag andDigital
Rights Management: Do Consumers Have a Chance?, 18 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 115, 118

(2007).
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range of legal interpretation.4 Indeed, how could a content owner properly
encode a fair-use exception into its rights control system when a judge
could not even state a dispositive test for what is considered a fair use of
copyright? Due to this, TPMs limited consumer uses of digital content
much more than their analog counterparts.5 This was first considered an
unavoidable, yet necessary, tradeoff for content distribution in digital
form. However, critics have seen this as an overprotection of content
owners' rights and have sought to reestablish uses traditionally enjoyed by
consumers, despite the owners' employment of rights control.6
In recent years, Congress has also shown interest in rebalancing the
rights of consumers and content owners by introducing bills to limit the
effectiveness of DRM services. Proposals like the BALANCE Act, 7 the
Digital Consumer Right to Know Act, 8 and the Digital Media Consumer
Rights Act (DMCRA)9 directly attacked the gap between uses allowed
under recent DRM services and the actual uses allowed by copyright law.
Most of the legislative debate has been focused on proposals that try to
carve out fair-use exceptions from the anti-circumvention provisions of the
DMCA. I° The proposed exceptions usually reflected the fair use rights
specified in 17 U.S.C. § 107" and are exemplified in the U.S. Supreme
Court's ruling in Sony v. Universal Studios, 2 and Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose. 13 However, much less attention has been made to proposals
that would require specific labeling of products that use DRM methods. 4

4. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576-77 (1994) (discussing the
multiple factors courts need to weigh when evaluating fair-use defense on a case-by-case basis).
5. For example, compare TPMs that limit the transfer of digital files between storage
devices to the free transfer of physical copies of books and CDs as a result of the first sale doctrine,
which limits the how copyright holders can control the second-hand sale of copies. 17 U.S.C.
§ 109(a) (2000).
6. Pollack, supra note 2, at 2452.
7. Benefit Authors without Limiting Advancement or Net Consumer Expectations
(BALANCE) Act of 2005, H.R. 4356, 109th Cong. (2005).
8. Digital Consumer Right to Know Act, S. 692, 108th Cong. (2003).
9. Digital Media Consumers' Rights Act of 2005 (DMCRA), H.R. 1201 § 5, 109th Cong.
(2005).
10. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-05 (2006).
11. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
12. Sony Corp. ofAm. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,442-46 (1984) (allowing
devices that had substantial non-infringing uses to be produced despite potential for infringing use).
13. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
14. Compare length of testimony concerning fair-use exception section of the bill (390 hits)
to testimony concerning the sections that imposed mandatory labeling (3 hits). The DigitalMedia
Consumers' Rights Act of2003: Hearing on H.R. 107 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade
and Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. (2004).
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While the fair-use exception directly attacked the gap between the
copyright owners' self-help and the traditional rights of the consumer,15
the labeling requirement used the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC)
power over deceptive acts and practices 16 to force content owners to
explain the limitations their DRM imposed. This would enable the
consumer to make an informed decision, based on the specific restrictions
of a DRM technology. As a result of consumers making logical purchasing
decisions, market forces would rebalance the rights of the interested
parties, since consumers would be more willing to pay for files that
afforded them more rights.
In this Article, I will argue that Congress can best address the
inadequacy of DRM services by imposing mandatory labeling
requirements on all media that incorporates digital rights management
services, which would lower consumer confusion and encourage fair
competition. Imposing mandatory labeling requirements is a step beyond
current industry practices, which are voluntary and have little
standardization for what information to disclose.' 7 Given the proper
information, consumers would be able to make informed buying decisions
on TPM-protected media based on what collateral impact the protections
method has on the product. As a result, different DRM services would be
in direct competition with each other based upon their level of restriction.
In the open market, less restrictive media would become more valuable,
and more robust DRM services would emerge that would incorporate freer
consumer uses and would accurately reflect the content owners' statutory
rights and limitations. As a result, consumer uses and exemptions currently
enjoyed outside digital media would be encoded in the DRM, properly
rebalancing the relationship between content owners and consumers with
minimal governmental intervention and oversight.
In this Article, in Part II, I will detail the legal foundation and
reasoning of copyright law that enables the use of DRM by content owners
and why these current controls are inadequate for consumers. I will then
detail the legal precedents for mandatory labeling requirements in federal
consumer protection and unfair competition laws and explain why it is an
15. See Marc Fetscherin, Evaluating ConsumerAcceptancefor ProtectedDigital Content,
in LECTURE NOTES IN COMPUTER SCIENCE No. 2770, DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT:

TECHNOLOGICAL ECONOMIC, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL ASPECTS 234, 315 (Eberhard Becker et al.
eds., 2003) [hereinafter LECTURE NOTES].
16. See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2005) (Granting FTC power to prohibit misleading advertisements
and labels).
17. See, e.g., Press Release, IFPI, IFPI Announces New Optional Copy Control Symbol for
CDs (Sept. 17, 2002) (on file with author) (voluntary guidelines used to denote copy-protected
compact discs).
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adequate use of the FTC's power to make labeling and disclosure
mandatory not only for physical media, but also for more transient digital
distributions. Finally, in Part 1I, I will propose an adequate disclosure
technique that evaluates both the immediate and secondary consequences
of DRM services and gives the consumer the adequate amount of
information to make an informed decision of whether to accept the terms
proposed by the content provider.
II. BACKGROUND

A. Copyright Law
Though the rights granted to content providers are outside the
limitations of copyright law, they are closely associated with copyright law
and the protections afforded in sections 1201-02 grow from the foundation
behind the government's justification for giving such a monopoly to
individuals for limited periods.
1. Fundamental Purpose of Copyright
The U.S. Constitution includes a provision that protects copyright, a
form of monopoly for original creative expressions given to the author for
limited periods."8 The historical intent in granting this limited monopoly
was to benefit the public interest in creation and innovation by inducing
authors to create original works and share them with the public. 9 Through
the grant of a monopoly, authors have a greater incentive to invest time
and money to create original works of expression, since the monopoly
gives the author legal protection from the risk of unauthorized copying by
others. 2' This risk comes in the form of a third party copying the author's
original work without permission, directly competing without any of the
overhead associated with its initial creation. 2' The risk also includes the

18. Copyright Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
19. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201,219 (1954) ("The economic philosophy behind the clause
empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of
authors and inventors in 'Science and the useful Arts."').
20. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright, 18 J.
LEGAL STUD. 325, 331-32 (1989).
21. Id. at 328.
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for
threat of potential consumers using unauthorized copies as substitutes
22
the original work, denying compensation to the original author.
However, Congress also realized that the public benefits from broad
access to and usage of copyrighted works. Since benefiting one interest
necessarily hinders the other, Congress has tried to sculpt the rights and
exclusions associated with the grant of copyright to best balance the
adversarial interests of providing a greater incentive for content providers
to create with the interest of granting users broad access and use of these
works once they are published.23 Congress also strives to limit the scope
and power of the monopoly inherent in copyright to only what is necessary
to induce authors to create.24
2. DRM as Incentive to Create Digital Works
In traditional media, owners were able to adjust their prices to account
for losses due to unauthorized copying. Authors could compensate for lost
potential sales due to unauthorized copies mainly by adjusting for the
difference in quality between the authorized publication and the
unauthorized copy, in addition to the costs associated with producing the
unauthorized copy. 25 An example of this practice was indirect
appropriability, where the author charged a higher price to her customers,
who in turn allowed others to copy the purchased work.26 However,
indirect appropriability did not properly allow authors to compensate for
the risks of unauthorized coping of digital works.27 Unlike earlier analog
forms, many digital files act as perfect substitutes for the original and have
little associated physical (e.g., copying and distribution) costs. 28 As a

22. See Tobias Bauckhage, The Basic Economic Theory of Copying, in LECTURE NOTES,
supra note 15, at 234 (discussing how an author uses indirect appropriability to account for users
in secondary markets).
23. Marc Fetscherin, Evaluating Consumer Acceptance for ProtectedDigital Content, in
LECTURE NOTES, supra note 15, at 314-15.

24. Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law,
at 4-6 (1961).
25. Under the Ordover/Willig economic model of copying, the price for the original
0
compared to the price of the unauthorized copy is P - T + Pc, where the T represents the costs of
copying and the difference in quality between the original (0) and the copy (C). When this
inequality is satisfied, an individual will prefer the original to the copy. Tobias Bauckhage, The

Basic Economic Theory of Copying, in LEcTuRE NOTES, supra note 15, at 241-42.
26. Id. at 242 (using the example of periodicals that have libraries as their primary
purchasers).
27. Marc Fetscherin, Evaluating Consumer Acceptance for ProtectedDigital Content, in
LECTURE NOTES, supra note 15, at 301-02.
28. Id. at 301-02.
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result, the only costs a user faced when obtaining an unauthorized copy,
compared to buying a legal version, was the risk of penalties associated
with copyright infringement.29 Content providers therefore had to price
their works below this value (the cost of fines multiplied by the probability
of detection). Since the piracy detection rate was so low,3" the price
content providers could logically charge would have been so low that there
was little reason to risk putting their works in digital form.
In order for content owners to place work in digital form, they needed
some protection from potential customers creating unauthorized, perfect
copies of their work. Content owners did this by using various access
control and rights management techniques that collectively were deemed
digital rights management systems.31 While these safeguards limited how
consumers could use digital files, DRM's main consequence was that it
tried to prevent unauthorized copying of digital files. The problem with
this form of self-help, however, was that it was still legal to circumvent
these systems or create devices to enable circumvention.3 2 This meant that
legal circumvention could have lead to rampant piracy of digital works,
since users could circumvent the protection method and distribute
unprotected copies. Thus, in order for DRM to be an effective technical
protection, there needed to be legal protection for the DRM.
The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) responded to
this problem through the enactment of both the Copyright33 (WCT) and the
Performances & Phonogram Treaties34 (WPPT) that specifically required

29. When evaluating the effectiveness of a protection technology, whether a person would
buy a digital original work over an unauthorized copy is expressed in the equation Po S 6VOj + pf,
where VO, is the perceived value of the original, 6is the quality difference between the original and
the copy, Po is the price of the original,p is the probability an individual will be caught pirating and
f is the expected fine. As & - 0, the copy acts as a perfect substitute and the price is solely affected
by the fine for piracy and the piracy detection rate. Id. at 304-05, 307-08.
30. Pollack, supra note 2, at 2446.
31. The most prevalent definition for DRM is that it is "software developed to enable secure
distribution - and.., to disable illegal distribution - of paid content over the Web." However,
the definition, "DRM covers the description, identification, trading, protecting, monitoring and
tracking of all forms of usages over both tangible and intangible assets" better encompasses all
forms of control exerted over digital content. Niels Rump, Definition, Aspects, and Overview, in
LECTURE NOTES, supra note 15, at 3-4.
32. See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255,262 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that
a company that produced software to help consumers circumvent copy protection and enable legal
consumer use was not liable for contributory infringement).
33. WIPO Copyright Treaty art. 11, Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOc. No. 105-17, 36 I.L.M.
65, 71 (1997) [hereinafter WCT].
34. WIPO Performances and Phonogram Treaty art. 18, Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY Doc. No.
105-17, 36 I.L.M. 76, 86 (1997) [hereinafter WPPT].
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member nations to adopt an anti-circumvention policy in regards to
systems protecting copyrighted works. The United States adhered to the
WIPO treaties through the passage of the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act (DMCA), which among other things, dictated the relationship between
consumers and content owners of digital media.35 Part of the Act's intent
was to induce authors to produce digital works by making the
circumvention of DRM illegal. This meant that content owners had a
viable route to stop unauthorized infringement of digital works, since there
were penalties for specifically circumventing protection techniques as well
as for copyright infringement.36 This gave consumers greater incentive to
buy digital works, since mere circumvention was illegal, making the risk
associated with copying higher, as well as hindering the ability of
consumers to make unauthorized copies.3 7
3. Controversy Over DRM Protections
The effectiveness of DRM itself created controversy. Unlike other
exclusive rights given to authors under the copyright statute, the anticircumvention provisions ofthe DMCA were not constrained by limits and
exceptions found in other sections of the copyright statute, such as fair
use.38 As a result, content owners had greater control over their digital
content than they had over their analog products, as the DRM attached to
digital content could dictate in great detail the scope of the consumer's
ability to use the media.39 While section 1201 (b) included some exceptions
that allowed unauthorized circumvention of rights-control protection, §
1201 (a)(1) forbade any circumvention of access-control protection.4" This
had a practical effect of forbidding any circumvention of digital content,
since the vast majority of DRM systems used access control as part of its
control scheme.4

35. Anti-Circumvention Provisions of the DMCA, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-05 (2006).
36. See, e.g., Realnetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., 2000 WL 127311, 12 (W.D. Wash.
2000).
37. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(1)(A), (b) (2005).
38. Universal Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429,443 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[Section 1201(c)(1)]
simply clarifies that the DMCA targets the circumvention of digital walls guarding copyrighted
material (and trafficking in circumvention tools), but does not concern itself with the use of those
materials after circumvention has occurred.").
39. Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1106-10 (2003).
40. MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW §§ 8.36-8.37 (LexisNexis 4th
ed., 2005).
41. Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyrightand Control Over New Technologies ofDissemination,101
COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1635 (2001) (If a user has to enter a password every time she needs to view
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This resulted in a chilling effect on consumers, since traditional
defenses used in response to copyright infringement no longer applied.
While courts ruled that consumers are still free to exercise fair use with
digital content, the courts also said that consumers were not allowed to
pursue the "best use" of copying, meaning that fair use is not a proper
defense for circumventing DRM
This meant that consumers were
required to use convoluted methods of copying for fair use, e.g., pointing
a camcorder at a television set playing a movie in order to copy a clip. As
technology transitions to purely digital distribution, this problem will
become more prevalent.
While there was a small controversy over whether this broad
interpretation of § 1201(a)(1) was Congress's actual intent,43 it was the
intent of the WIPO treaties (as well as Congress") to grant additional
rights to the content owner to compensate for the still-present risk of
massive piracy.45 These additional rights also gave content providers a
solid foundation from which to experiment with new business models
shaped for the unique nature of digital products, such as more complex
renting systems.46
This grant of control to the content owners can potentially lead to
multiple versions of the same work with different rights associated with
the varying formats. This means that individuals would have the ability to
buy digital forms of copyrighted content based on a particular format's
usage rights. For example, depending on one's incentive, a consumer can
now decide between watching a film in the theater, renting by way of a
physical disc, downloading a file that functions for a limited time or for
limited sessions, streaming of the movie in real time, or purchase through
physical disc or download. Each of these distribution models grants
different rights to the consumer and each version of the work has a
a work that is only available in access-protected digital format, then every act of reading that work
implicates the copyright owner's control of access).
42. Corley, 273 F.3d at 459.
43. See, e.g., Chamberlain v. Skylink, 381 F.3d 1178, 1194-200 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that
it was not Congress's intent to have separate scopes for access protection and rights protection
technology).
44. Ginsburg, supra note 41, at 1631 ("Congress's focus in the DMCA was not to console
copyright owners whose claims to control new devices had already been spurned, but to promote
a new exercise of copyright, by ex ante adjusting the rules governing the technology in aid of that
objective.").
45. WIPO Copyright Treaty pmbl., Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-17, 36 I.L.M.
65, 68 (1997).
46. See WILLIAM BUHSE & AMLIE WETZEL, CREATING A FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESS
MODELS FOR DIGITAL CONTENT-MOBILE MUSIC AS A CASE STUDY, LECTURE SERIES, 271,271-72

(2003).
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different price based partially on the rights allowed, since consumers are
aware of the different versions available to them and made purchasing
decisions based on what they were allowed to do with a particular version
of a film.47
B. Consumer ProtectionLaw
Consumer protection is closely related to another field in intellectual
property law, which is the federal protection of trademarks. Stemming
from Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce, federal statutes
and agencies govern fair trade practices in commerce and can affect the
trade practices of content owners without having to change portions of the
copyright statute.
1. Misleading Labels
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is an independent agency of the
federal government whose main purpose is the promotion of consumer
protection and the elimination and prevention of anticompetitive
practices.48 Based on their power in both these areas, the FTC has power
to regulate practices that deceive consumers.4 9 As a result, parties that
deceive consumers can either face charges for unfair competition (if a rival
company is at a competitive disadvantage as a result), or for confusion (if
a consumer was harmed based on confusion from a deceiver's product)."0
The FTC is in charge of enforcing consumer protection statutes,
including various statutes requiring mandatory labeling." One of the most
relevant in connection with current copyrighted work is the Fair Packaging
and Labeling Act,52 which authorizes the Commission to make additional
regulations when necessary to prevent consumer deception or to facilitate
value comparisons with respect to certain criteria.53 As stated in the statute,
the purpose behind these regulations is to inform consumers of the actual
product they are considering purchasing.54 In order to make such a
consideration in fair competition, the consumer must be able to make value
47. Id. at 286.
48. 15 U.S.C. § 4592 (2005); see also FTC v. Raladam Co., 316 U.S. 149, 152 (1942).
49. Consol. Book Publishers v. FTC, 53 F.2d 942 (7th Cir. 1931) ("The commission's
jurisdiction... embrace[s] false and fraudulent advertising, misbranding, and other practices which
result in deceiving the public. Such practices injure competitors who do not use them.").
50. 15 U.S.C. §§ 52, 53b (2005).
51. See FTC v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483,494 (1922).
52. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1451-61 (2005).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 1454c (2005).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 1451 (2005).
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judgments on the product based on important criteria. In terms of
mandatory disclosures and labeling:
[T]he Commission may require affirmative disclosures
where necessary to prevent deception, and that failure to
disclose by mark or label material facts concerning
merchandise, which, if known to prospective purchasers,
would influence their decisions of whether or not to
purchase, is an unfair trade practice violative of § 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act .... 5
Therefore, the FTC can require mandatory labeling whenever the
disclosure
is necessary for a prospective purchaser to make a reasonable
56
decision.
2. Application to DRM
Though many consumers understand the difference between piracy and
legal copies of content, they are unaware that DRM even exists, much less
57
why DRM is more restrictive than analog versions of copyrighted works.
When making purchases, most consumers expect to enjoy uses they were
traditionally afforded; such as making backup copies, playing in their
home media players at their leisure, and using portions in other works.
However, many DRM schemes do not allow such uses, forcing a consumer
to choose between buying another legal version of the work that has
broader rights offered to the consumer (if such a version exists), or
breaking the law to use the content as they want (through either direct
circumvention or use of a version with no usage restrictions).
This non-disclosure of restrictions might amount to deception,
especially in the case of copy-protected CDs, where there has been a long
history of broad use before the recent implementation of copy protection.
As evidenced in complaints, consumers bought the protected discs with the
expectation that they would have the ability to play the discs in CD players
and computer drives, rip versions of the files to play on their computer or

55. L. Heller & Son v. FTC, 191 F.2d 954, 956 (7th Cir. 1951).
56. In re Cliffdale Assoc., 103 F.T.C. 110 (1984) ("the Commission will find an act or
practice deceptive if, first, there is a representation, omission, or practice that, second, is likely to
mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances, and third, the representation,
omission, or practice is material.").
57. Nichole Dufft et al., DigitalMusic UsageandDRM, Resultsfrom a European Consumer
Survey, at 36 (May 24, 2005), http://www.indicare.org/tiki-downloadfile.php?fileld=1 10.

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGYLAW&

POLICY

[Vol. 12

portable media player and make backups of the disc in case it scratched,
which regular, unprotected CDs allow. Only after one had purchased the
protected disc did a consumer learn of its limitations. In a pure economic
sense, the content provider should offer restricted content at a lower price
than unrestricted content, as people are less willing to pay for more
restricted use.59 By not informing consumers of the copy protection and
offering the content at the same price as unrestricted discs, the providers
implied that the discs were equivalent when in fact they were not. Based
on case law in consumer protection, this amounts to consumer deception.6'
The comparison between copy-protected discs and unprotected CDs is
the most obvious illustration of the need for mandatory labeling. As more
content moves into digital form, however, there is less of a basis for
consumers' assumption of what uses are allowed and what the DRM actual
permits, since the old media might not set a precedent for it.61 However,
a consumer still needs some knowledge of what they are allowed to do
with media once purchased so that she can make a proper assessment on
what form best fits her needs. Not knowing of these restrictions before
purchase hurts both the consumer, who purchased the wrong product based
on an unclear assumption of rights, and competitors, who are at a
competitive disadvantage because they either sell less restrictive works or
fully disclose their restrictions and might seem less attractive in
comparison.

58. For example, one consumer filed a complaint against a record company for failure to
disclose that the CD would not play automatically on computer CD drives. See Press Release,
Rothken Law Firm, Fahrenheit Entertainment and Suncomm are Sued for Violating Privacy Rights
of California Consumers and for Unfair Business Practices, Sept. 6, 2001, http://www.techfirm.
com/mcrel.pdf.
59. Fetecherin points out that to properly change the economic model, o is added to account
for the restrictions. This means that the legal work is usually less desirable than the illegal work if
it acts as a perfect substitution. If the copy acts as a perfect substitution, consumers will not accept
the protected digital content. It is only when the protected content is considered more valuable that
the equation P _ Vo, (6- P) + /fsets the price for consumers to accept the protected digital content.
Fetscherin, Evaluating Consumer Acceptancefor ProtectedDigitalContent, in LECTURE NOTES,

supranote 15, at 316-19.
60. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2 (1995).

61. As an example, consumers had a hard time editing video from VHS tapes, setting little
precedent for consumers' expected use of digital versions of copyrighted video.
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III. ANALYSIS
A. Labeling as the Least Intrusive Method to Regulate DigitalRights
Management Systems
There has been great difficulty in striking a proper balance between
copyright owners and consumers when redrafting rights and limitations to
the anti-circumvention provisions. Given that conundrum, the federal
government could exercise its power over trade to help consumers use
their purchasing power to encourage content providers to exercise less
control over the digital works they distribute.
1. The Problems with Redrafting the Anti-Circumvention Provisions
Many of the proposed bills that change the copyright law are either too
specific to properly grant users traditional rights, while others are too
broad to encourage owners to publish their works in digital format. 62 DRM
systems do not work in isolation. It is a combination of technology, law,
and a business model that makes a DRM system effective. 63 The problem
with shaping laws that effectively foster DRM is that the technology and
business models are in constant flux. Any major change to the legal
foundations of technological protection would require drafters to work
toward a specific business model and technology. Otherwise, there would
be no rational basis for changing the law. While the current legal
protection of DRM may seem overly broad, it is necessary because of the
instability in the technology and the business models used to distribute
digital media.
Any significant change to the scope of exemptions to § 1201 would
meet strong resistance from copyright owners because of the still
significant risk of mass piracy stemming from the use of the exception.'
As evidenced by previous rulemaking sessions, the Librarian of Congress
is leery of giving out too many exceptions to section 1201 for this very

62. See, e.g., BALANCE Act of 2005, H.R. 4356, 109th Cong. (2005); DMCRA, H.R. 1201,
109th Cong. (2005); Consumers, Schools, and Libraries Digital Rights Management Awareness Act
of 2003, S. 1621, 108th Cong. (2003); FAIR Use Act of 2007, H.R. 1201 110th Cong. (2007).
63. Niels Rump, Definition, Aspects, and Overview, in LECTURE NOTES, supra note 15, at
3-4.
64. See, e.g., The DigitalMedia Consumers 'Rights Act of2003: Hearingon H.R. 107 Before
the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 108th Cong. (2004).
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reason." Similarly, making specific fair-use defenses to section 1201
would either be too limited in scope, making them meaningless for most
consumers, or overly broad, discouraging content owners from publishing
their works in digital form. It would also create confusion between the
current fair use defenses (which already require case-by-case analysis66 ),
and the "new" fair use defense, creating situations where a user has
adequate justification for using the underlying content without having
adequate justification for circumventing the technology and would
therefore still be liable for illegal circumvention.67
The construction of section 1201(b) demonstrates how unstable such
sculpting of the scope of the legal protection can be. In its current form,
section 1201(b) allows circumvention by conduct, meaning that given
adequate justification, an individual can circumvent technologies that
restrict use. However, section 1201(b)(1) prohibits the trafficking of
devices that enable such circumvention.6" This, in effect, limits the scope
of the exception to individuals who are capable of hacking through DRM
control schemes independent of devices (including software) designed to
do so, making the exception so narrow as to be almost negligible. If,
however, the scope of the exception was broadened, using DRM to protect
content owners' rights might be moot, since devices used to circumvent
the technology would be legal and freely available.
Other proposed schemes require the heavy involvement of a
government regulatory regime, similar to those seen in patents and
trademarks.69 This is undesirable mainly because it would "transform one
of the least regulated U.S. industries into a much more regulated one in
which inventors might have to seek permission from the government

65. See U.S. Copyright Office, Exemption to Prohibitionon Circumvention of Copyright
ProtectionSystemsfor Access Control Technologies, 65 Fed. Reg. 64,556,64,574 (Oct. 27,2000)
(codified as 37 C.F.R. 201); 68 Fed. Reg. 62,011, 62,012 (Oct. 31, 2003) (codified as 37 C.F.R.
201).
66. See U.S. Copyright Office, Exemption to Prohibitionon Circumvention of Copyright
ProtectionSystemsfor Access ControlTechnologies, 68 Fed. Reg. 62,011,62,012 (Oct. 31, 2003)
(codified as 37 C.F.R. § 201).
67. If a defendant had justification for the underlying work, but not for circumventing the
copy protection, the defendant is precluded from acquiring the digital copy.
68. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006).
69. For example, Mark Stefik suggested using a Digital Property Trust to decide issues of fair
use, including royalty rates for fair use. Mark Stefik, Shifting the Possible: How TrustedSystems
andDigitalPropertyRights Challenge Us to Rethink DigitalPublishing,12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
137, 156 (1997).
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before creating new products."7 ° This has the potential to limit innovation,
both in the development of new copyrightable expressions and new DRM
technologies. 7'
2. Use of the FTC to Rebalance Rights Given in the AntiCircumvention Provisions
The use of the FTC's power to regulate misleading advertisements and
labeling is the least restrictive means of adequately ebbing the overreach
of DRM technology. As content transitions from analog to digital
distribution and playback, consumers still expect the same range of use
and control they traditionally enjoyed over their media.72 Companies will
try to meet consumers' demands and expectations, delivering content in
different ways and with different restrictions attached. 73 However, using
different distribution methods (and different pricing schemes) only works
if consumers understand the differences in their allowed usage before
purchase.
While this information is important for the consumer to make a
reasoned purchase, it is not necessarily in the best interest of the seller to
disclose these restrictions blatantly, since this makes his product less
desirable. From a competitive standpoint, nondisclosure would benefit the
seller if the consumer assumed that she is gaining more than what she
actually purchased. Such practices put both the buyer and the seller's
competitors at a disadvantage because of the confusion over what the
buyer is actually acquiring.
Mandatory labeling requirements would force sellers to specify what
restrictions are associated with the purchase of a specific digital work.
When these restrictions are fully disclosed, the consumer has enough
information to make an informed decision on what she needs to buy and
at what price. From this, sellers would be able to create more robust
business models of content distribution based in part on the consumer's
demands for the scope of usage. This would not only lower confusion that
arises from traditional interactions with the media, but would also
encourage sellers to make DRM technology that more accurately reflects

70. Declan McCullagh & Milana Homsi, Leave DRM Alone: A Survey of Legislative
ProposalsRelating to DigitalRights Management Technology and Their Problems, 2005 MICH.
ST. L. REv. 317, 324 (2005).
71. Id.
72. Duffi et al., supranote 57, at 25-27.
73. For example, ABC broadcasts its serial drama series in high definition, posts the episodes
later on their web site as streaming video, sells low-definition downloads on iTunes, and later sells
DVDs for playback in higher definition.
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their limitations under current copyright law, since he would be able to sell
these "liberated" versions at a higher price.74
This method is also desirable because it would only require minimum
governmental oversight through the FTC, acting in an area (mandatory
labeling) where it already has experience. The FTC is currently charged
with enforcing a number of mandatory labeling requirement statutes in
other industries. From this experience, it has made procedures and
precedent to respond to the changes in the industry. 75 Through these
conduits, it has the capacity to respond to changes in content distribution
and can adapt the labeling requirements for each specific business model
that incorporates DRM. Since the government regulation is merely on
labeling and not the technology itself, the industry is still free to innovate
and make new steps in technology without having to seek government
approval or comply to overly restrictive requirements of the technology
itself; a company merely has to disclose the consequences of the
technology once implemented.
B. How to ProperlyEvaluate DRM
In order for a labeling system to be effective, relevant information
needs to be displayed to consumers in order for them to make informed
decisions. In regards to DRM, these metrics involve immediate issues like
restrictions on access, consumer rights, and interoperability, as well as the
collateral impact of DRM technology on consumer privacy and
anonymity.76 These broad areas of information can be broken down into
a number of key categories, including personal use and copying, choice
and interoperability, permanence, facilitating end-user creativity, and
privacy, security and anonymity.77
1. Personal Use and Copying
This metric evaluates the extent DRM permits personal uses and
copying of content. This mainly comes into play because consumers
expect certain capabilities to engage in practices like time and place
74. Dufft et al., supranote 57, at 25 ("consumers are willing to pay for more usage rights and
device interoperability").
75. The FTC has power to proceed after the finding of deceptive industry-wide practice
through rulemaking. 15 U.S.C. § 57a (2005).
76. OECD, REPORT ON DISCLOSURE ISSUES RELATED TO THE USE OF COPY CONTROL AND
DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT TECHNOLOGIES 11-12 (2006)
77. CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., EVALUATING DRM: BUILDING A MARKETPLACE FOR THE

CONVERGENT WORLD 11-20 (Version 1.0 ed. 2006), http://www.cdt.org/copyright/20060907drm.
pdf.
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shifting. While owners' control on consumer use in this area was
traditionally limited by the first sale doctrine 7' and similar statutes, DRM
gives owners the capability to specifically monitor and restrict copying and
transference. 79 This metric would mainly evaluate how much sharing the
DRM system allows, since some services allow sharing of playlists and
specific files permanently or for limited periods, while others place
limitations on practices like time or place shifting.
2. Choice and Interoperability
This metric looks into which playback choices are available to the user.
This metric might be of the most immediate concern to consumers, as
many potential buyers have an expectation that the item that they intend
to purchase works for a specific device." DRM that allows use on a wide
variety of devices" or is reliable to work on all devices adhering to a
specific standard 2 is generally more valuable than DRM that is more
restrictive. This metric would not only indicate which systems are capable
of playing the work, but whether conversion of the file to a different
format is allowed.
3. Permanence
This metric looks into a number of factors, including how long
playback is allowed (indicating whether the sale is for purchase or for
rental), if the user is able to make archival copies, and whether the owner
has the ability to change the consumer usage rights after purchase. This
metric makes the user aware of how long they are allowed to enjoy the
work, as well as whether the uses they agree to at purchase are subject to
change. This is especially important, since consumers are not traditionally
used to having usage rights change (especially if the change is more
restrictive) after purchase.

78. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2005).
79. Transference involves moving the file from one device to another so that only one copy
is held at one time. Moving the file from Device A to Device B means automatically deleting the
file from Device A.
80. Dufft et al., supranote 57, at 23.
81. User has the ability to modify the format to adhere to another DRM scheme, e.g., giving
user the ability to change a music file from protected WMV format (protected by Playsforsure), to
protected AAC format (protected by FairPlay).
82. For example, a protected DVD that works on all DVD players.
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4. Facilitating End-User Creativity
Digital technology gives users a much greater ability to use copyrighted
works in their own creations. This metric evaluates whether the technology
itself allows consumers to use the files in other programs outside of
playback (it does not, however, evaluate whether the artist allows the use
of the underlying copyrighted work). Consumer use of the copyrighted
work can range from using a screenshot of a movie as wallpaper for their
computer or using a song for playback in a home video, to allowing users
to modify software applications such as creating new levels for a video
game.
5. Privacy, Security, & Anonymity
This metric looks at the collateral impact that DRM has on a user.
Because DRM involves a wide range of interaction between the consumer
and the content owner, consumers may not know how this interaction
plays out after purchase. This metric indicates whether data about the
consumer or her usage habits is sent back to the content owner, whether
extra software is installed on a device beyond what the user expects,83
whether the DRM would affect the functionality of other devices or
software the user currently has, and whether the DRM carries any risk of
impairing the security of the user's devices.
While disclosure about a particular DRM technology's effects in all
these metrics does not need to be on the label or conspicuously announced
before making at the point of purchase, the consumer needs access to
information in all these areas before purchase in order to properly evaluate
whether to buy media that uses a specific DRM scheme.
C. ProperDisclosure Techniques
There are many industries 84 and many distribution models that
incorporate DRM. Thus, one specific label to be used for all digital content
is infeasible, since disclosure would place an improper burden in certain
industries. As consumers become accustomed to purchasing digital media,
the expectations of where disclosure takes places and what information is
presented will also shift, as demands for immediate information will

83. For example, installation of a media player, which a consumer might expect, versus
installation of authentication software or software that may pose a security risk. See Texas v. Sony
BMG Music Entm't, Dist. Ct. Travis Co, Tex., filed Nov. 21, 2005.
84. In this note, I am mainly discussing the music, film, television, publishing, and software
industries, which use different models of distribution.
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change as people become more aware of DRM. However, the standard
"label" that makes these disclosures on use restrictions should be more
analogous to the labels used to disclose the content of food ("Nutrition
Facts") than disclosures used in traditional End User's License
Agreements (EULAs), which consumers have learned to ignore altogether
because they are so obtuse.
Considering the categories of metrics used to evaluate DRM,
information on metrics that are of immediate impact to the consumer
should be presented every time before the consumer can make a
purchase. 85 Most of these metrics are embedded in the content, since they
are considered "terms and conditions for the use of the work"86 and
removal of this information might make the user liable for copyright
infringement.8 7 Based on these embedded terms and conditions, the
information should be displayed to the consumer in a form that is easy to
decipher and evaluate quickly, so consumers are not encouraged to ignore
the information. For example, information regarding the interoperability
capabilities of a work can be disclosed through the use of standardized
symbols for what devices can play the content (much like Microsoft's
Playforsure symbol indicates what devices can play works using that DRM
scheme88 ). Other information can be disclosed in a table style (such as
whether back-up copies are allowed, how long a work can be viewed, and
whether information about the user is sent back to the content owner),
while other information might need further elaboration (such as whether
user is allowed to use content in other software and whether the terms can
change after purchase) and might require disclosure in another easily
accessible area directly relating to the point of purchase, such as a link on
the web site.
The FTC should accept suggestions from both the affected industries
and consumer groups and shape the requirements for labels based on the
limitations of the implemented business models and the interests involved.
Also, the label should be physically affixed on the package if sold in

85. The All Party Parliamentary Internet Group, a joint group to foster discussion between
British Parliament and media industries, recommended that all use restrictions and risks involved
with purchase are clearly spelled out at the point of purchase. ALL PARTY PARLIAMENTARY
INTEREST GROUP [APIG], "DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT": REPORT OF AN INQUIRY BY THE ALL

105, 113 2006 (U.K.), http://www.apcomms.org.uk/apig/currentactivities/apig-inquiry-into-digital-rights-management/ DRMreport.pdf.
86. 17 U.S.C. § 1202c (2005). In order to be covered by the section, the CMI must be
conveyed in connection with copies or phonorecords of a work or performances or displays of a
work, including in digital form.
87. See 17 U.S.C. § 1202(a) (2005). This violation is separate from a violation of§ 1201.
88. OECD,supra note 76.
PARTY INTEREST GROUP,
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physical form (like on a software box or DVD), or a separate click-through
window that a user observes before downloading protected content from
a web site. While labels used for computer software might not look at all
similar to those used for movies, consumers would still have enough
information about the rights and restrictions on a piece of digital content
to make an informed decision before purchase. Furthermore, consumers
will have an expectation that such information is readily available and will
demand such disclosures when the content owner does not present them.
IV. CONCLUSION

There is little Congress can do directly to the copyright statute that
would successfully limit the scope of the provision without substantially
reducing the incentive to publish copyrighted works in digital form.
Therefore, the best course of action for Congress to take is to encourage
competition between content owners to resolve the imbalance between
copyright owners and consumers, and their respective practicable rights
and restrictions. Given the proper information, consumers as a whole will
use their buying power to influence what technologies will flourish.
Consumers will demand technologies that allow freer use and will pay
more for works that have less restrictions imposed on them. The best way
to expedite this competition between restriction methods would be to
require disclosure of exactly what limitations consumers have a choice
between, so the consumer would be able to make informed buying
decisions before purchase. The FTC should require disclosure both on
immediate concerns related to the limitations imposed by DRM, including
interoperability, copying, and permanence, as well as secondary concerns,
such as security, privacy, and anonymity, as these factors are all material
when making a decision on whether to purchase a copyrighted work.
Using this matrix, economic forces will effectively rebalance the
dichotomy between technological protection methods and traditional rights
and uses given in copyright law.

